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I. INTRODUCTION  
Picture a female judge who is married with two young girls in 
the state of Louisiana. This female judge and her husband have de-
cided to legally separate and file for divorce. In the custody agree-
ment, both parties mutually agree that the mother would maintain 
custody of the girls, with a weekly visitation schedule with the fa-
ther. After this agreement, the mother entered into a serious relation-
ship with another woman, and the other woman eventually moved 
in with the judge and her children. The father then filed for an in-
junction in a Louisiana state court for the mother to lose custody 
rights of their children because he felt that the girls’ emotional de-
velopment was at risk. How would the state court in Louisiana de-
cide? Does the father have a claim against the mother of his chil-
dren? 
Traditional definitions of family stem from two conflicting ar-
eas: the law and the culture of the area.1 One major conflict is be-
tween those who defend the family as a unique organization based 
on heterosexuality, and those that believe a family can be diverse 
and not based solely on heterosexuality.2 In the United States, the 
                                                                                                             
 1 See Juan Marco Vaggione, Chapter 7 Families Beyond Heteronormativity, 
in GENDER AND SEXUALITY IN LATIN AMERICA - CASES AND DECISIONS 233 (Cristina 
Motta &Macarena Saez eds., 2013). See Juan Marco Vaggione, Chapter 7 Fami-
lies Beyond Heteronormativity, in GENDER AND SEXUALITY IN LATIN AMERICA - 
CASES AND DECISIONS 233 (Cristina Motta &Macarena Saez eds., 24 IUS 
GENTIUM 233 (2013). 
 2 Id. at 233. 
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changing image of the family has undergone a slow transformation. 
However, it is clear that it is unconstitutional to include a parent’s 
sexual orientation in child custody disputes.3 On the other hand, in 
South America, the Catholic Church continues to be the main polit-
ical opposition to passing laws and the expression of public policies 
favorable to sexual and reproductive rights.4 For example, the Chil-
ean Supreme Court took Karen Atala’s, a prominent judge, children 
away simply because she was a homosexual.5 Therefore, in South 
America, LGBTQ rights are moving at a much slower pace than in 
the United States.6 
In the absence of laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation or gender identity, LGBTQ parents, like Karen 
Atala, who share children with a heterosexual parent, may remain at 
risk of losing custody battles.7 Throughout the 21st century, the Su-
preme Court has ruled on landmark decisions giving homosexuals 
the same constitutional rights as heterosexuals.8 For instance, in 
Lawrence v. Texas, the Court “held that the Texas statute making it 
a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate 
sexual conduct was unconstitutional, as applied to adult males who 
had engaged in a consensual act of sodomy in privacy of home.”9 
Scholars have argued that Lawrence “brings traditionally neglected 
constitutional principles into family law to shield gay parents from 
the biases they typically face in this area.”10 
Additionally, in Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court condemned dis-
crimination against LGBTQ individuals because the discrimination 
                                                                                                             
 3 See generally Matt Larsen, Lawrence v. Texas and Family Law: Gay Par-
ents’ Constitutional Rights in Child Custody Proceedings, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. 
AM. L. 53 (2004); (discussing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)). 
 4 Vaggione, supra note 1. 
 5 Larry Rohter, Lesbian Judge Fights Chilean Court for Taking Her Chil-
dren, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/20
/world/americas/20chile.html. 
 6 See id. 
 7 See Douglas E. Abrams, Naomi R. Cahn, Catherine J. Ross, David D. 
Meyer & Linda C. McClain, Adoption, in CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW, 383 (4th 
ed. 2015). 
 8 Amisha Padnani & Celina Fang, Same-Sex Marriage: Landmark Decisions 
and Precedents, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interac-
tive/2015/06/26/us/samesex-marriage-landmarks.html 
 9 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
 10 Larsen, supra note 3 at 55. 
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was referenced as an “unjustified inequality within our most funda-
mental institutions that once went unnoticed and unchallenged.”11 
Not only did the ruling in Obergefell address the marital rights of 
same- sex couples, it also implicated other areas of family law with 
LGBTQ orientation.12 
This article will conduct a comparative analysis of LGBTQ 
rights between the United States and South America. Specifically, 
regarding the progression of homosexual rights of child custody in 
the United States and South America throughout the last decade. 
Part II will discuss the landmark American Supreme Court cases that 
have changed the way the country now looks at LGBTQ rights, par-
ticularly in custody disputes, while also explaining the role of the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Part III will address Judge 
Karen Atala’s pivotal case in the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights and how her case has become the symbol of a human rights 
violation. Finally, Part IV will present an argument regarding the 
impact of Judge Atala’s case in Chile and will also explain the com-
parison of LGBTQ rights in Chile throughout the last decade to such 
rights in the United States. 
II. PRIOR LAW AND PERSPECTIVE 
A. Best Interest Standard in the United States 
In child custody disputes in the United States, courts weigh var-
ious factors in determining the child’s “best interests” under statutes 
or common law.13 Under the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 
the court determines custody in accordance with the best interest of 
the child.14 In doing so, the Act states that: 
The court shall consider all relevant factors includ-
ing: (1) the wishes of the child’s parent or parents as 
to his custody; (2) the wishes of the child as to his 
custodian; (3) the interaction and interrelationship of 
                                                                                                             
 11 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2590 (2015). 
 12 Autumn L. Bernhardt, The Profound and Intimate Power of the Obergefell 
Decision: Equal Dignity As A Suspect Class, 25 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 1, 2 
(2016). 
 13 UNIF. MARIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402 (amended 1973). 
 14 Id. 
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the child with his parent or parents, his siblings, and 
any other person who may significantly affect the 
child’s best interest; (4) the child’s adjustment to his 
home, school, and community; and (5) the mental 
and physical health of all individuals involved.15 
The gender of a parent’s new partner or partners may or may not 
make a difference to the court’s evaluation of harm to the child de-
pending on jurisdiction and the judge.16 In custody issues involving 
LGBTQ biological parents, courts generally rely on two doctrinal 
approaches in determining custody rights: the nexus approach and 
the per se approach.17 Adopted by at least 50% of the states, the 
nexus approach only considers a parent’s homosexuality when de-
termining custody if the parent’s sexual orientation is shown to harm 
the child.18 As recently as 2007, at least half of the states, as well as 
the District of Columbia, took the view that a parent’s sexual orien-
tation could be a factor in the best interest analysis but could not 
determine the outcome absent a showing of harm to the children.19 
The per se approach, only adopted in a minority of jurisdictions, as-
signs the greatest significance to a parent’s sexual orientation.20 Un-
der the per se approach, courts presume that a LGBTQ biological 
parent’s sexual orientation is adverse to the best interests of the child 
and will deny custody to such a parent even if there is no evidence 
that the parent’s sexual orientation has had any effect on the child.21 
                                                                                                             
 15 Id. 
 16 Abrams, supra note 7, at 837. 
 17 Ada Orakwusi, Child Custody, Visitation and Termination of Parental 
Rights, 8 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 619, 634 (2007). 
 18 Id.; see also Maxwell v. Maxwell, 382 S.W.3d 892 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012) 
(holding that because the best interest factors allowed consideration of a parent’s 
misconduct but did not mention sexual orientation it was reversible error for a 
judge to award custody to the father based on the mother’s sexual orientation in 
the absence of a showing that the children were harmed by it or that it interfered 
with their relationship with their mother.). 
 19 Id. at 634-35. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id.; see also Scott v. Scott, 665 So. 2d 760, 766 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (hold-
ing that a change in custody from mother to father was warranted because of 
mother’s homosexual relationship. In assessing whether a parent’s sexual lifestyle 
is a cause for removing or denying custody, the court must consider: (1) whether 
the children were aware of the illicit relationship, (2) whether sex play occurred 
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B. Cases in the United States 
1. Lawrence v. Texas 
In Lawrence v. Texas, two men, the petitioners, were arrested, 
charged, and convicted of violating a Texas statute making it a crime 
to engage in oral or anal sex with a person of the same sex, even in 
the privacy of their own home.22 Petitioners appealed a decision of 
the Court of Appeals in Texas that upheld a state law that made it a 
crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate 
sexual conduct.23 In a divided opinion, after hearing the case en 
banc, the Supreme Court rejected the affirmed convictions from the 
lower court using Bowers v. Hardwick as their support.24 In Bowers 
v. Hardwick, the Court upheld a Georgia statute prohibiting private, 
consensual sodomy between both homosexual and heterosexual 
couples.25  In a 6-3 opinion, the Court, in Lawrence, held that the 
Texas statute making a crime for two persons of the same sex to 
engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process 
Clause26 and overturned Bowers.27 In the majority opinion, Justice 
Kennedy concluded that the issue in Bowers, “demeans the claim 
the individual put forward, just as it would demean a married couple 
were it to be said marriage is simply the right to have sexual inter-
course.”28 Kennedy went on further to discuss that the court in Bow-
ers ruled the way it did to make a broader stance on the immorality 
of homosexual conduct seen through religious beliefs and respect 
for the traditional family.29 He argued that is not the issue at stake, 
                                                                                                             
in their presence, (3) whether the conduct was notorious and brought embarrass-
ment to the children, and (4) what effect the conduct has on the family home life.). 
 22 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 563 (2003). 
 23 Id. 
 24 Id. at 564. 
 25 Id. at 566. 
 26 Id. at 558; see U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or natural-
ized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws.”) (emphasis added). 
 27 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558 at 578. 
 28 Id. at 567. 
 29 Id. at 571. 
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and that “[o]ur obligation is to define liberty for all, not to mandate 
our own moral code.”30 The Court also went on to reason that when 
homosexual conduct is made a criminal offense under state law, this 
leaves homosexuals subject to discrimination publicly and pri-
vately.31  The majority concluded that the petitioners have a right 
under the Due Process Clause to engage in conduct without govern-
ment intervention.32 In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor based her 
conclusion on a breach of the Equal Protection Clause,33 rather than 
the Due Process Clause because the Texas statute in this case made 
sodomy illegal only between individuals of the same sex, not indi-
viduals of opposite sex. O’Connor therefore concluded that Texas 
treated the same action differently solely based on sex.34 
Justice Scalia, in his dissent, stated that nowhere in the majority 
opinion does it state that homosexual sodomy is a fundamental right 
under the Due Process Clause.35 Also, if homosexual sodomy was a 
fundamental right, the majority’s reasoning of the Texas’ statute 
does not reach the standard of review of strict scrutiny.36 Scalia also 
argued that if a state law prohibits homosexual sodomy, then the 
majority of the people believe that it is a legitimate state interest, 
and therefore the Texas’ statute is constitutional under the rational 
basis test.37 
2. United States v. Windsor   
In United States v. Windsor, the court held that the Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA) was unconstitutional because its definition 
                                                                                                             
 30 Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
844, 850 (1992)). 
 31 Id. at 575. 
 32 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
 33 Id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 
(“All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or im-
munities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”) (emphasis added). 
 34 Id. at 581. 
 35 Id. at 587. 
 36 Id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 37 Id. at 589. 
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of marriage deprived married same-sex couples rights equal to that 
of married opposite-sex couples.38 In Windsor, two women residing 
in New York were married in Ontario, Canada.39 New York State 
recognized the Ontario marriage as valid through the “full faith and 
credit” clause of the Constitution.40  When one of the women died, 
the other left her entire estate to the surviving spouse.41 The surviv-
ing spouse sought to claim the estate tax exemption for the surviving 
spouse.42 However, the DOMA defined marriage to be a “union be-
tween one man and one woman” and the definition of spouse re-
ferred only to a “person of the opposite sex who is a husband or 
wife.”43 The district court and the court of appeals both held that the 
provision was unconstitutional.44 
In a 5-4 decision, Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority ex-
pressing that marriage is a province of the state, and if a state enacts 
a law that confers marriage rights on same-sex couples, but these 
couples cannot benefit from federal rights and privileges that are en-
joyed by opposite sex couples, then the state and federal government 
are creating two different marriage regimes.45 Kennedy stated that 
“DOMA writes inequality into the entire United States Code, “ and 
that “this places same-sex couples in an unstable position of being 
in a second-tier marriage,” and same-sex marriage is not deeply 
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.46 Three justices, Rob-
erts, Scalia, and Alito, wrote dissents in Windsor.47 Justice Scalia, 
stated that the majority opinion allows the government to regulate 
social and sexual norms, i.e. same-sex marriage.48 While, Justice 
Alito discussed that DOMA is constitutional because nowhere in the 
                                                                                                             
 38 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013). 
 39 Id. at 2682. 
 40 Id. at 2683; see U.S. Const. amend. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be 
given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every 
other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in 
which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect 
thereof.”). 
 41 Id. at 2702 (Scalia J., dissenting). 
 42 Id. 
 43 See id. at 2683 (citing 1 U.S.C. § 7). 
 44 Id. at 2682. 
 45 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694. 
 46 Id. at 2707 (Scalia J., dissenting). 
 47 See generally Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675. 
 48 Id. at 2698-2714 (Scalia. J., dissenting). 
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Constitution does it guarantee the right to same-sex marriage.49 He 
reasoned that although the issue of same-sex marriage is an issue of 
public policy, substantive due process protects “fundamental 
rights . . .  deeply rooted in this nation’s history” and that the right 
to same-sex marriage is not deeply rooted in this Nation’s history 
and tradition.50 
3. Obergefell v. Hodges, The Changing of American History 
In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court held under the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, that same-sex couples have a fundamental right to marry.51 
The petitioners were fourteen same-sex couples, including two men 
whose same-sex partners were deceased.52 Laws of Michigan, Ken-
tucky, Ohio, and Tennessee were held invalid in their respective dis-
trict courts to the extent they excluded same-sex couples from civil 
marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex cou-
ples.53 The Court of Appeals combined the cases and reversed, con-
cluding that the states were not constitutionally obligated to recog-
nize or legalize same-sex marriage.54 In a 5-4 decision, Justice Ken-
nedy wrote for the majority and reasoned four principles as to why 
marriage is a fundamental right under the Constitution: 1) marriage 
is vital to the concept of individual autonomy;55 2) Marriage sup-
ports a two-person union different from anything because of its im-
portance to the committed individuals;56 3) Marriage protects chil-
dren and families, and therefore heightens the importance of chil-
drearing, procreating, and education;57 and 4) Marriage is the key-
stone of social order.58 Kennedy eloquently stated that, “[i]f rights 
were defined by who exercised them in the past, then received prac-
tices could serve as their own continued justification and new groups 
could not invoke rights once denied. This Court has rejected that 
                                                                                                             
 49 Id. at 2714 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 50 Id. at 2714-15. 
 51 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015). 
 52 Id. at 2593. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 2599. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600. 
 58 Id. at 2601. 
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approach, both with respect to the right to marry and the rights of 
gays and lesbians.”59 Because same-sex couples can exercise the 
fundamental right to marry in all states, the court concluded that 
there was no lawful basis for a state to refuse to recognize a lawful 
same-sex marriage performed in another state on the ground of its 
same-sex character.60 
In this highly-contested case, all four dissenting judges wrote 
separate dissents. In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts explained that 
even though the majority made strong arguments for the inherent 
fairness regarding same-sex marriage,that it is still up to the individ-
ual states to decide.61 In a statutory approach, he discussed that the 
Constitution does not formally define marriage, and because of this, 
the fundamental right to marry does not mean that a state can change 
its definition of marriage.62 In another dissent, Justice Scalia argued 
that “[t]he Supreme Court of the United States has descended from 
the disciplined legal reasoning of John Marshall and Joseph Story to 
the mystical aphorisms of the fortune cookie.”63 He reasoned that 
the majority departed from legal Fourteenth Amendment jurispru-
dence to create a policy where none exists in the Constitution.64 Jus-
tice Thomas also argued that the majority’s decision threatens the 
religious liberty of our country by legislating from the bench rather 
than allowing the state legislatures rule on this issue.65 And finally, 
Justice Alito wrote, “[t]oday’s decision shows that decades of at-
tempts to restrain this Court’s abuse of its authority have failed.”66 
C. Chile- Culture and Politics 
In 1990, after seventeen years of brutal repression, the Chilean 
people ousted General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte’s military dictator-
ship and ushered in a new era of cultural and political debate.67 
                                                                                                             
 59 Id. at 2602. 
 60 Id. at 2607-08. 
 61 Id. at 2611 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 62 Id. 
 63 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2630 n. 22 (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
 64 Id. at 2628 (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
 65 Id. at 2638 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 66 Id. at 2643 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 67 Sarah R. Hamilton, The Status of Women in Chile: Violations of Human 
Rights and Recourse Under International Law, 25 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 111 
(2004). 
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While the dictatorship liberalized Chile’s economy, its social poli-
cies and disregard for human rights prevented the country from fully 
joining the ranks of modern Western nations.68 Due to the powerful 
influence of conservative religious factions within the government, 
Chilean laws do not protect significant human rights for thousands 
of Chilean women and they also do not reflect the predominant so-
cial values of the general population.69 The single greatest barrier to 
Chilean social liberalization is the Catholic Church, which wields 
tremendous political power and is arch-conservative on women’s is-
sues.70 Many high-ranking conservative politicians, particularly 
those who profited under the dictatorship, support Church policies 
and are often members of backward-looking Catholic organizations 
like Opus Dei and the Legionaries of Christ.71 
Since its independence, Chile has had ten constitutions;72 how-
ever, only three of them are especially important, in view of their 
common characteristics and duration: the 1833, 1925 and 1980 Con-
stitutions.73 They adopted and consolidated a unitary state, with a 
presidential system and the same separation of powers (President, 
Congress and Judiciary).74 But the 1833 and 1925 Constitutions 
formed part of a period wherein the influence of the classical Euro-
pean continental tradition was very strong, which is why those con-
stitutions were seen as political instruments without direct legal 
value.75  Chapter III of the 1980 Constitution contains a long list of 
                                                                                                             
 68 See generally Press Release, Committee on the Elimination of Discrimina-
tion Against Women (“CEDAW”), Chile Ending ‘Gender Order’ Based on Ex-
clusion, Violence Against Women, Women’s Anti-Discrimination Committee 
Told U.N. Press Release WOM/1144 (June 22, 1999), available at http:// 
www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19990622.wom1144.html [hereinafter 
CEDAW, Press Release 1144]. 
 69 Sarah R. Hamilton, The Status of Women in Chile: Violations of Human 
Rights and Recourse Under International Law, 25 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 111, 
112 (2004). 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 These laws are enacted to interpret the Constitution. Article 66 of the Chil-
ean Constitution required three-fifths of the senators and deputies. 
 73 José Ignacio Martínez Estay, Chapter 4 the Impact of the Jurisprudence 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights on the Chilean Constitutional System, 16 
IUS GENTIUM 63, 67 (2012). 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 68. 
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rights and liberties (Article 19), and includes a special mechanism 
to protect them before courts of law called recurso de proteción.76 
Because of this, judges play a vital role because the Chilean Consti-
tution is now enforceable before courts of law.77 
D. Inter-American Court on Human Rights 
In 1969, the Organization of American States adopted the Amer-
ican Convention on Human Rights.78 The Convention created the 
Inter-American Court on Human Rights, which was then established 
in 1979 with headquarters in San Jose, Costa Rica.79 The Court 
meets in regular and special sessions several times a year to examine 
allegations of human rights violations in the Western hemisphere.80 
Its determination of human rights stems from three documents: the 
Organization of American States Charter, the American Declaration 
of the Rights and Duties of Man, and the American Convention on 
Human Rights.81 
The Inter-American Court was charged with three main func-
tions: first, to render binding decisions on contentious cases; second, 
to make binding decisions on provisional measures in situations of 
extreme gravity and urgency to avoid irreparable damage; and third, 
to issue advisory opinions on human rights issues.82 To accomplish 
these goals, the Court has jurisdiction over the countries of the 
Americas that have both ratified the American Convention on Hu-
man Rights and have explicitly consented to the Court’s jurisdic-
tion.83 All the countries in Latin America that have ratified the Con-
vention have accepted jurisdiction of the court.84 However, the 
                                                                                                             
 76 Protection resource; Martínez Estay, supra note 65 at 68. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Introduction, ORG. OF THE AM. STATES, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr
/mandate/Basics/intro.asp#_ftnref1. 
 79 Id. 
 80 See generally What is the IACHR?, Org. of Am. States, 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/what.asp (last visited January 23, 2016). 
 81 Basic Documents in the Inter-American System, Org. of Am. States, 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/intro.asp (last visited January 23, 
2016). 
 82 Judge Diego García-Sayán, The Role of the Inter-American Court of Hu-
man Rights in the Americas, 19 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 103, 104 (2012). 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
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United States, Canada, and some Anglo-speaking countries in the 
Caribbean are part of the Organization of the American States, but 
are not parties of the Convention, and therefore have not accepted 
jurisdiction of the Court.85 There are currently 24 countries that are 
parties to the American Convention and 21 of those countries have 
accepted the jurisdiction of the Court.86 The jurisprudence of the 
Court has become a source of guidance and doctrinal orientation for 
many decisions in national courts.87 Some countries have laws in 
their constitutions that place a ruling by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights above their own courts.88 
By filing a petition before the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (“Commission”), victims of alleged human rights vi-
olations can try to obtain relief through the hearing process. Once 
the petition is filed, the Commission investigates the alleged viola-
tion and decides on its admissibility.89 An Admissibility Report is 
approved if the petition meets the admissibility requirements set 
forth in Articles 46 and 47 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights, in accordance with the procedure established in Articles 30 
to 36 of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure.90 When an admissi-
bility report is adopted, the petition is registered as a case and a pro-
ceeding on the merits begins.91 The adoption of an admissibility re-
port does not constitute a prejudgment on the merits of the matter.92 
Once the case has been deemed admissible, the Commission then 
issues a report, which generally contains recommendations.93 If the 
government that the report is directed at does not implement these 
recommendations, the Commission can refer the case to the Inter-
                                                                                                             
 85 Id. at 105. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 108. 
 88 Larry Rohter, Lesbian Judge Fights Chilean Court for Taking Her Chil-
dren, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2006), http://www.ny-
times.com/2006/07/20/world/americas/20chile.html. 
 89 What is the IACHR?, Org. of Am. States, 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/what.asp (last visited January 23, 2017). 
 90 Admissibility Reports, Org. of Am. States, 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/admissibilities.asp (last visited February 9, 
2018). 
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American Court on Human Rights.94 The Commission is the body 
that presents the cases to the Inter-American Court when domestic 
remedies have been exhausted and the process at the Commission 
was unsuccessful.95 
The Court today hears a variety of different issues.96 As a result 
of authoritarian regimes and military dictatorships, the Court’s first 
cases mostly dealt with disappearances, torture, or extrajudicial kill-
ings.97 The Court has also decided cases about amnesties and self-
amnesties that include major human rights violations.98 Some deci-
sions from the Court have led to changes in legal provisions in Costa 
Rica, Guatemala, and Peru regarding due process in administrative 
and judicial proceedings.99 
E. The American Convention 
The American Convention on Human Rights, also known as the 
Pact of San José, is an international human rights agreement.100 It 
was adopted in many countries in the Western Hemisphere on No-
vember 22, 1969. 101 The bodies responsible for overseeing compli-
ance with the Convention are the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court on Human Rights, both 
of which are institutions of the Organization of American States 
(OAS).102 Article 11, Section 2, the Right to Privacy, of the Ameri-
can Convention states that “no one may be the object of arbitrary or 
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abusive interference with his private life, his family, his home, or 
his correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his honor or reputa-
tion.”103 
Article 17, Section 1, the Rights of the Family, states “the family 
is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled 
to protection by society and the state.”104 
F. Marta Lucía Álvarez Giraldo v. Colombia 
Prior to Judge Atala’s case, the Commission found that discrim-
ination on the basis of sexual orientation violated human rights.105 
The Petitioner, Marta Lucía Álvarez Giraldo (“Giraldo”), an inmate 
at a women’s prison in Colombia, was denied her right to intimate 
visits with her same-sex partner because of her sexual orientation.106 
The Ombudsman for the town where the prison was located, ap-
pealed the prison director’s decision denying Giraldo visits with her 
partner to a criminal court, which upheld the director’s decision.107 
The court in Colombia refused to review the case.108 
The Petitioner appealed to the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, asserting that the prison authorities’ refusal to permit 
her right to intimate visit violated Articles 5, 11, and 24 of the Amer-
ican Convention on Human Rights.109 These articles protect the right 
to humane treatment, privacy, and equal protection.110 Giraldo also 
alleged that the relevant Colombian legislation did not limit the right 
to intimate visits based on sexual orientation.111 The Colombian 
State did not challenge admissibility of the case, but sought to justify 
its refusal as to the merits of the case on the grounds of security, 
discipline and morality in penitentiary institutions.112 The Commis-
sion reached out to the parties with a goal of reaching a friendly 
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settlement on the matter;113 however, the State rejected the possibil-
ity of a friendly settlement.114 
III. KAREN ATALA AND DAUGHTERS V. STATE OF CHILE 
A. Procedural History 
On March 29, 1993, Karen Atala married Ricardo Jaime López 
Allende.115 The couple had three daughters, M., V., and R., who 
were born in 1994, 1998, and 1999, respectively.116 Atala also had a 
son from a previous marriage.117 In March 2002, Atala and Allende 
decided to end their marriage.118 As part of the dissolution of their 
marriage, they established, by mutual consent, that Atala would 
maintain the custody of the three girls, with a weekly visitation 
schedule at the home of their father.119 In November of 2002, Emma 
de Ramón, the partner of Atala, moved in and started living with the 
three daughters and the eldest son.120 
The father of the three girls filed a custody suit with the Juvenile 
Court of Villarrica on January 14, 2003, claiming that the “the phys-
ical and emotional development [of the girls] was seriously at risk” 
if they continued to live in the care of their mother.121 López argued 
that Ms. Atala “[was] not capable of watching over and caring for 
[the three girls, given that] her new sexual lifestyle choice, together 
with her cohabiting in a lesbian relationship with another woman, 
[were] producing [ . . . ] harmful consequences for the development 
of these minors” because the mother had not shown any concern for 
the care and protecting the development of the girls.122 In addition, 
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López argued that “[to] treat as normal, within the legal order, part-
ners of the same sex [leads] to distort the meaning of a human cou-
ple, man and woman, and therefore, alters the natural meaning of 
the family, [ . . . ] since it affects the fundamental values of the fam-
ily, as the core unit of society;” therefore, Atala’s sexual choice dis-
rupts the healthy, fair, and normal coexistence to which the three 
children have a right.123 López finally argued that it is also necessary 
to take into account “all of the consequences of a biological nature 
that would be implied for minors living with a lesbian couple,” in 
terms of diseases given the sexual practices of a lesbian couple, the 
girls would be under risk of contracting sexually transmitted dis-
eases, such as herpes and AIDS.124 Because Atala was so widely 
known in the Chilean community, numerous media organizations 
covered the custody suit, including newspapers with national circu-
lation such as Las Últimas Noticias and La Cuerta.125 
On May 13, 2003, even though there was no evidence to pre-
sume the legal incompetence of the mother, the Juvenile Court of 
Villarica granted provisional custody of the girls to the father and 
regulated the mother’s visits.126 The Juvenile Court reasoned that 
Atala altered the normal family routine of her daughters and instead 
gave “preference to her personal interests and well-being over the 
emotional well-being and social development of her daughters.”127 
On May 8, 2003, in compliance with the decision of the Juvenile 
Court of Villarrica, Atala brought her three daughters to their fa-
ther.128 In response to the Juvenile Court’s decision, Atala sought to 
prevent the Regular Judge of the Juvenile Court of Villarica from 
continuing to hear the case based on grounds of incompatibility.129  
The Regular Judge of the Judge of the Juvenile Court of Villarica 
declared “sufficient grounds” for incompatibility and granted 
Atala’s request.130 
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Given that the Regular judge was disqualified from hearing the 
case, on October 29, 2003, the Acting Judge of the Juvenile Court 
of Villarica rejected López’s petition for custody.131 The Judge con-
cluded that the existing evidence established that Atala’s sexual ori-
entation was not an impediment to carrying out responsible mother-
hood, that there was no psychiatric pathology that would prevent her 
from exercising her role as a mother, and that there were no indica-
tions that would allow for the presumption of any grounds for inca-
pacity on the part of the mother to take on the personal care of the 
minors.132 
B. The Appeal 
Then on November 11, 2003, López filed an appeal against the 
court’s decision and a petition for a temporary injunction against 
Atala, arguing that complying with the lower court’s decision would 
mean “a radical and violent change in the girls’ current status 
quo.”133  Thereafter, on November 24, 2003, the Court of Appeals 
of Temuco granted the injunction.134 
C. Supreme Court of Justice of Chile 
“On May 31, 2004, the Fourth Chamber of Chile’s Supreme 
Court of Justice, in a split three-to-two decision, admitted the com-
plaint appeal and granted permanent custody to the father.”135 The 
Court concluded that “the potential confusion over sexual roles that 
could be caused in [the girls] by the absence from the home of a 
male father and his replacement by another person of the female 
gender poses a risk to the integral development of the children from 
which they must be protected.”136 “The Court also deemed the girls 
to be in a ‘situation of risk’ that placed them in a vulnerable position 
in their social environment,” because their family environment dif-
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fers significantly from that of their friends, “exposing them to ostra-
cism and discrimination, which would also affect their personal de-
velopment.”137 
In dissent, the two judges argued that depriving the mother of 
custody of her daughters solely on her sexual choice imposes an il-
legal, “unnamed sanction” on the daughters and on their mother, in 
addition to being discriminatory.138 Furthermore, the dissent argued 
that, “a judge cannot change the general rule of where to place the 
care of the children based on arbitrary judgments or unjustified, friv-
olous or ambiguous grounds, but rather only when a restrictive ex-
amination of the legal standard and the accompanying evidence 
shows an ‘essential’ interest of the child.”139 
D. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Case of Atala 
Riffo and Daughters v. Chile 
Then, on November 4, 2004, Karen Atala and her attorneys filed 
a petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights al-
leging that the state of Chile violated “the right to personal integrity 
(Article 5(1)); the right to a fair trial (Article 8); the right to protec-
tion of the honor and dignity (11(1)); the right to privacy (Article 
11(2)); the rights to protection of the family (Article 17(1) and 
17(4)); the rights of the child (Article 19); the right to equal protec-
tion (Article 24); and the right to judicial protection (Article 25)” in 
the American Convention on Human Rights, “in conjunction with 
violation of the obligations to guarantee rights and to give domestic 
legal effect to rights set forth in Articles 1(1) and 2 of the American 
Convention; and Articles 2, 5, 9 (2) and (3), 12, and 16 of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child” (hereinafter, the 
“Convention on the Rights of the Child”). 140 
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Atala’s initial petition was submitted before the Inter-American 
Commission on November 24, 2004 by Atala,141 and was approved 
by the Report on Merits on December 18, 2009.142 The Inter-Amer-
ican Commission on Human Rights concluded that the state of Chile 
“did violate the right of Atala to live free from discrimination as 
provided in Article 24 of the American Convention . . . .”143 Also, 
the Commission required the Chilean government to “hold an act of 
public acknowledgement” and “implement education programs and 
training courses” regarding this issue.144 On September 17, 2010, 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights filed a claim 
against the Republic of Chile in relation to Karen Atala Riffo’s 
case.145 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights held that the 
state of Chile had not complied with the recommendation made in 
the Report on Merits, and decided to submit the case to the jurisdic-
tion of the Inter-American Court.146 The Court’s role, however, was 
not to issue a ruling on the custody of the three girls because that is 
a matter reserved exclusively for Chile’s domestic courts147 The 
case concerned the alleged international responsibility “for the dis-
criminatory treatment and arbitrary interference in the private life 
suffered by Atala due to her sexual orientation” by the State.148 “The 
case also concern[ed] the court’s alleged failure to take into account 
the best interest of the girls, whose custody and care were deter-
mined without their opinions and on the basis of sexual discrimina-
tion . . . .”149 “The Commission requested the Court to declare Chile 
in violation of Articles 11 (Right to Privacy), 17(1) and 17(4) 
                                                                                                             
 141 Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judg-
ment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 1 (Feb. 24, 2012). 
 142 Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Case 12.502, Inter-Am Comm’n H.R., 
Report No. 139/09, ¶ 23 (2010). 
 143 Id.. 
 144 Id. ¶ 24. 
 145 Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judg-
ment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 1 (Feb. 24, 2012). 
 146 Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Case 12.502, Inter-Am Comm’n H.R., 
Report No. 139/09, ¶ 38 (2010). 
 147 Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judg-
ment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 66 (Feb. 24, 2012). 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
84 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:64 
 
(Rights of the Family), 19 (Rights of the Child), 24 (Right to Equal 
Protection) and 25 (Right to Judicial Protection) of the Conven-
tion . . . .”150 
The Commission argued that Atala’s sexual orientation, partic-
ularly the expression of that orientation in her lifestyle, was the main 
ground for the decision” to take away her custody of her daugh-
ters.151 “[T]he State argued that there was compelling evidence that 
showed that Atala had an intensely self-centered attitude and per-
sonal characteristics that made it difficult for her to adequately ex-
ercise a maternal role, circumstances that led to the conclusion that 
the mother did not offer a suitable environment for the development 
of the daughters.”152 
I. The Right to Equality and the Prohibition of Discrimination 
In regards to equality and discrimination, Chile argued that when 
the Member States signed the American Convention, they gave their 
consent to a number of human rights violations in mind, and not to 
others that had not existed at the time.153 Chile further argued that 
when it signed the Convention, sexual orientation was not a suspect 
category; therefore, it had not violated the Convention.154 In re-
sponse, the Supreme Court of Chile reasoned that the American 
Convention does not give an explicit definition of the term “discrim-
ination.”155 
In a truly landmark decision, the Court reasoned that the term 
“or another social condition” leaves open the opportunity to include 
other categories that had not been explicitly indicated.156 Therefore, 
the Court should construe the term “or another social condition” in 
the light most favorable for the human being and “in the light of the 
evolution of fundamental rights in contemporary international 
law.”157 The Court thus reasoned that the State discriminated in the 
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respect of a right contained in the Convention, and therefore failed 
to comply with its obligation under the Convention.158 
The Court also pointed out that even though the Inter-American 
Court has not recognized sexual orientation as “another condition” 
of discrimination, the European Convention on Human Rights had 
in the Case of Salgueiro da Silva Mouta v. Portugal159 and again 
reiterated this notion in the Case of Clift v. United Kingdom.160 The 
Court stated that the State’s argument that some countries do not 
respect the rights of sexual minorities is not an effective legal argu-
ment to repeat that discrimination in Chile.161 They stated that the 
Court cannot abstain from issuing a decision merely because the 
rights of sexual minorities are a controversial issue in some coun-
tries, and must “refer solely and exclusively to the stipulations of the 
international obligations arising from the sovereign decision by the 
States to adhere” to the Convention.162 
II. Difference in Treatment Based on Sexual Orientation 
The Court reasoned that discriminatory treatment occurred be-
cause the custody process focused on Atala’s sexual orientation as 
well as on the alleged effect that her partner could have on the three 
girls.163 Therefore these discriminatory considerations were central 
to the discussion in the main judicial decisions made during the pro-
ceeding.164 The Court stated that the arguments and the language 
used showed a link between the judgment and the fact that Atala was 
living with her homosexual partner. This connection indicates that 
the Supreme Court of Chile allotted significant weight to Atala’s 
sexual orientation.165 
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III. The Child’s Best Interest 
The State argued that it was in the girls’ best interest to not live 
with their mother, and alleged that the girls had suffered due to their 
mother’s sexual orientation.166 The Commission indicated that the 
Supreme Court and the Juvenile Court of Villarica based their deci-
sions on “assumptions of risk derived from prejudices and erroneous 
stereotypes” of a certain social group and, therefore, the judges’ de-
cisions were based on their “stereotyped conceptions of the nature 
and effects of relationships between people of the same sex.”167 
The Court reiterated that the regulating principle on children’s 
rights is derived from “the very dignity of the human being, on the 
characteristics of children themselves, and on the need to foster their 
development, making full use of their potential.”168 The Court added 
that cases regarding the determination of a child’s best interest in-
volve the custody and care of children whose parent’s behavior neg-
atively impact the child’s well-being, and is not “speculative or im-
aginary.” Additionally, the Court noted that “assumptions, stereo-
types, or generalized considerations” involving parents’ personal in-
terests are not admissible as risks.169 The Inter-American Court con-
cluded that the State attempted to allege the children’s risk or dam-
age because of Atala’s sexual orientation without any proof or phys-
ical evidence of the children’s harm.170 In an integral development 
of the law, the Court therefore held that the child’s best interest can-
not be used to justify discrimination against the parents based on 
their sexual orientation and therefore cannot be taken into consider-
ation as a component in a custody case.171 
IV. Right to Private Life 
The Commission held that the State’s intrusion into Atala’s pri-
vate life was “arbitrary,” since the custody decision was based on 
discriminatory prejudices focused on her sexual orientation and also 
interfered with Atala’s freedom to make her own decisions of her 
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personal life.172 The Court has held in the past that the realm of pri-
vacy is “exempt and immune from abusive or arbitrary intrusion or 
aggression by third parties or by public authorities.”173 The Court 
also noted that the justification that the State gave for interfering into 
Atala’s private life was that it was in the best interest of the three 
girls.174 Even though the Court acknowledged that serving the best 
interest of the three girls was a legitimate goal of the state, the Court 
promulgated that domestic courts should have been limited them-
selves to examining parental behavior, including aspects of Atala’s 
private life, but that domestic courts should not have exposed and 
scrutinized Atala’s sexual orientation.175 
V. Right to Family Life 
One of the main points deliberated in the judgment of the Su-
preme Court of Chile and the decision of the Juvenile Court of Vil-
larica was the fact of Atala’s cohabitation with her lesbian partner. 
176 The Inter-American Court found it essential to examine the do-
mestic court’s violation of the right to family alleged by the Com-
mission and the representatives.177 The European Court of Human 
Rights has reasoned that “a cohabiting same-sex couple living in a 
stable de facto partnerships, falls within the notion of ‘family life,’ 
just as the relationship of a different-sex couple in the same situation 
would,” and that it is unnatural to maintain the view that a same-sex 
couple cannot enjoy family life in the same way as a different-sex 
couple for the purposes of Article 6 of the European Convention.178 
The Court noted that, in the domestic trials, there had been evi-
dence of a close relationship between Atala, De Ramón, Atala’s 
older son, and the three girls.179 In a public hearing before the Inter-
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American Court, Atala stated that, “we were an absolutely normal 
family . . . [a] boy, three girls, a cat, a male dog, a female dog, a 
house, we had projects as a family . . . [w]e had dreams of a fam-
ily.”180 It was clear that Atala, her partner, and the children com-
prised a family unit under the Articles 11(2) and 17(1) of the Amer-
ican Convention, because the family had a close personal and emo-
tional relationship, involving frequent contact.181 Because of this de-
termination, the Court concluded that the domestic courts violated 
Convention when the State arbitrarily interfered with Atala’s family 
life and separated the children in an “unjustified manner” from their 
family environment.182 
VI. Right to Judicial Protection 
The Commission concluded that the Supreme Court of Chile and 
the Juvenile Court of Villarica had violated Article 8(1) and Article 
25 of the American Convention because those decisions had not 
given Atala a fair impartiality by considering her sexual orientation 
as the primary factor in her fitness as a mother.183 At the same time, 
the Commission concluded that the State had not violated the judi-
cial guarantees established in the Convention, because there was no 
evidence that indicating a situation in which the judges were shown 
to have partiality.184 
VII. Right of the Children 
The Commission noted that the Supreme Court of Chile “made 
no efforts to hear the girls.”185 Article 8(1) of the American Conven-
tion protects every persons’ rights to be heard, including children, 
in proceedings in which their rights are being determined.186 This 
right must also be interpreted in relation to Article 12 of the Con-
vention on Rights of the Child, which includes particular situations 
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in which a child can be heard, according to his/her age and maturity, 
after ensuring that it does not harm his general well-being.187 
The Commission determined that the Juvenile Court of Villarica 
did comply with the child’s right to be heard, because it clearly 
stated that the views of the three girls were taken into account.188 
However, the Court held that the Supreme Court of Justice of Chile 
did not mention the wishes expressed by the girls in the complaint 
or in the ruling of the Supreme Court.189 
VIII. Reparations 
Testimony given by psychiatrists in the Commission’s case 
showed that Atala and her daughters suffered as a result of this hu-
man rights violation.190 As such, the Court ordered the State to pro-
vide Atala and her daughters “appropriate and effective medical and 
psychological care” for four years.191 The Court also ordered that 
the State shall publish, within six months from the notification of 
the judgment, the official summary of the judgment written by the 
Inter-American Court, once only, in the Official Gazette, in a news-
paper of broad national circulation and that the entire Judgment shall 
be posted on a government website for a period of one year.192 
The Court also believed that the State must publicly 
acknowledge its international responsibility.193 Therefore, the Court 
ordered the State to openly announce the human rights violation in 
the manner of a public ceremony, which was to be discussed with 
the victims’ representative in advance.194 The Inter-American Court 
emphasized that the State needed to guarantee that an event like this 
would not happen again and that the reparations towards the State 
should have a “transformative” purpose to promote structural 
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changes and to dismantle certain stereotypes and practices that prop-
agate discrimination toward LGBTQ groups.195 The Court ordered 
the State to implement educational programs and training courses 
in: i) human rights, sexual orientation and non-discrimination; ii) 
protection of the rights of the LGBTQ community; and iii) discrim-
ination, overcoming gender stereotypes of LGBTQ persons and 
homophobia.196 The Court ordered that these courses be directed to-
ward public officials at the regional, national, and judicial levels.197 
IX. Compensation for Pecuniary and Non-Pecuniary Damages 
The Court found that Atala and the girls’ medical expenses from 
the emotional and psychological trauma from the case could not be 
precisely determined.198 However, the Court found that the future 
medical expenses should be covered through the implementation of 
the rehabilitation measure for medical and psychological care al-
ready ordered. Additionally, the Court ordered that the State pay 
$10,000 USD to cover the medical costs already incurred.199 
The Court reasoned that the violations alleged in the case had 
led to different types of damage in the victims’ lives, as well as dif-
ferent levels of stigma and distress.200 The Court noted that, in a 
public hearing, Atala stated that she felt “profoundly humiliated, ex-
posed, as if she had been stripped down naked and thrown into the 
public square.”201 Atala also declared in that hearing that, because 
of this case, her reputation, personal activities, and her social and 
family relationships were all affected.202 As a result, the Inter-Amer-
ican Court granted non-pecuniary damages of $20,000 USD to 
Atala, and $10,000 USD to each daughter.203 
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As for costs and expenses, the Court must assess the expenses 
incurred in the domestic and international level for the case.204 Tak-
ing into account both parties’ arguments, the Inter-American court 
ordered the State to pay $12,000 USD to the victim, Atala, for costs 
and expenses incurred throughout the trial. 
E. Analysis 
I. Impact of Inter-American Court on Human Rights in South 
America 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has had a major im-
pact in alleviating discriminatory conduct against homosexuals in 
South America. Because the Inter-American Court provides a long 
list of detailed actions that a State must abide by to resolve a viola-
tion, rather than just awarding monetary compensation, it remains 
unique from other international bodies. For example, all the of the 
remedies the Inter-American Court on Human Rights awards are 
“remedies of government” because they require a State to act in a 
certain manner and to change its previous practice.205 The Inter-
American Court is “the only international human rights body with 
binding powers that has consistently ordered equitable remedies in 
conjunction with compensation.”206 Also, after the Court issues a 
reparatory ruling, the Court continuously monitors a State’s compli-
ance. In the Court’s reparations orders, frequently, a State reports its 
compliance efforts within a set period.207 
An issue with the Inter-American Court on Human Rights oc-
curs when its decisions clash with the decisions of a State’s national 
court. This leads to confrontation between national and international 
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courts. The question is which court is judicially superior: if the in-
ternational court is understood to be judicially superior, then the in-
terpretation by an international court is superior to its national coun-
terpart. In Chile, the Constitution does not explicitly enunciate the 
hierarchy of the various international treaties on human rights, but 
rather states that all international treaties are subject to the Consti-
tution.208 Further, the Chilean constitutional system gives treaties 
the same legal status as ordinary laws.209 As such, it is possible to 
appeal against treaties that deal with human rights since they are ju-
dicially inferior to the Constitution.210 That is why they can be re-
viewed in order to determine whether they are in accordance with 
the Constitution.211 
Another issue arises when an international court declares a hu-
man rights violation that goes against a State’s culture and history. 
For states to listen and cooperate, the “Inter-American Court must 
make itself matter to local state actors beyond the foreign ministry 
to achieve greater implementation of its rulings.”212 This can mean 
years of overseeing how state actors carry out detailed injunctive 
orders until it deems there has been full compliance.213 Out of 285 
cases in the Inter-American Court, only 33 percent of them complied 
with the Court’s orders.214 Additionally, if three branches of the state 
government are involved— the executive, the public prosecutor, and 
the judiciary— compliance drops even further to 2 percent.215 
Therefore, strict oversight over state actors is essential in resolving 
human rights violations. 
Compliance with the Inter-American Court’s orders is crucial 
for many reasons. First, the Court mostly hears high-profile cases of 
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egregious state violations of fundamental rights,216 like that of the 
case of Karen Atala. Also, many of these cases affect not just a sin-
gle victim, but groups of victims.217 For example, in Karen Atala’s 
case, even though she solely brought action against the State of 
Chile for declining the right to custody of her children on the basis 
of sexual orientation, her case provides precedence for all homosex-
uals in custody disputes throughout Chile. Also, remediation and 
reparations in politically prominent cases are not only ways of seek-
ing justice, but also ones that gain attention at the national and in-
ternational levels.218 And finally, as in Atala’s case, the Court fre-
quently issues “non-repetition measures,” ordering the state to make 
structural changes to assure that similar injuries do not occur.219 
In most cases, however, the Inter-American Court continues to 
confront problems in achieving important and long-lasting imple-
mentation of its orders.220 Lack of political will, along with the pow-
erful position of the armed forces and police in various Latin Amer-
ican countries, inhibits the Court’s efforts in prompting states to 
punish the offenders.221 On top of that, even if a country’s supreme 
court or national government is receptive to Inter-American juris-
prudence, local government and authorities that are actually respon-
sible for the daily implementation usually resist the Court’s order, 
slowing down the advancement of human rights locally.222 
It has been an ongoing debate as to how to make Latin American 
countries comply with Inter-American Court orders. Some scholars 
believe that the best way to ensure that a State complies with Inter-
American Court decisions is to use media attention and public sup-
port.223 Past events indicate that advancement of human rights in 
many Latin American countries is most likely to occur when posi-
tive media coverage, public support, and/or international pressure 
can be brought to bear on a given issue.224 Others believe that the 
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Court should be more mindful of national high courts, and less quick 
to impose its judgment on that of a Supreme Court.225 
II. LGBTQ Rights in the United States 
Despite decades of research that have consistently shown sexual 
orientation is not a relevant factor in terms of a person’s ability to 
parent or in terms of the psychological adjustment of children,226 to 
this day, some parents in the United States still lose custody of their 
children due to their sexual orientation. While societal prejudice as-
sociated with homosexuality may prove to be a source of distress for 
children of homosexual parents, the degree of stress is not correlated 
to the amount of responsibility a homosexual parent has for a child. 
227 It is more about responsibility assigned to the parents, not neces-
sarily time. 228 The American Law Institute has even stated that con-
sidering homosexuality as a negative factor in determining child 
custody may reinforce the stigma of that status, making the child’s 
acceptance of the parent more difficult.229 
In the past, many parents lost custody of their children simply 
because they were LGBTQ even in the absence of any evidence that 
their sexual orientation had harmed the children. For example, in 
Scott, the court ordered the transfer of custody of sons from their 
lesbian mother to their heterosexual father based on the childrens’ 
purported confusion about gender roles while in their mother’s cus-
tody.230 Simply put, being LGBTQ in and of itself was sufficient for 
the court in Scott to deny child custody, this reasoning is known as 
the per se test.231 
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Many commentators and advocators believe that the per se test 
cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny after the decision in Law-
rence.232 In Lawrence, the U.S. Supreme Court held that adults have 
a protected liberty interest in private, adult, consensual, noncom-
mercial, intimate sexual conduct.233 Commentators believe that (1) 
Lawrence struck down all remaining statutes criminalizing private, 
adult consensual conduct; and (2) that, as a result, courts can no 
longer rely on sodomy statutes to support their claims that LGBTQ 
parents are engaging in criminal conduct, and therefore, use this to 
deny the LGTBQ parent custody of children.234 Additionally, Law-
rence arguably limits the extent to which a court can rely on societal 
disapproval of LGTBQ people as a basis for limiting their custodial 
rights.235 Finally, some commentators believe that it would be im-
permissible to deny or restrict a parent’s custody because the parent 
is engaging in constitutionally protected conduct.236 
Even though the majority rule today is that sexual orientation 
cannot be considered unless there is evidence that it has resulted in 
harm to the child, there are a few outliers. Even post-Lawrence, 
courts have relied on a parent’s sexual orientation in denying that 
parent custody.237 For example, in a 2012 Kentucky case, Maxwell 
v. Maxwell, a lesbian mother was successful in overturning a cus-
tody award to the heterosexual father; however, her ability to live 
with her partner remained an issue on remand, thereby demonstrat-
ing the limits on the lower court applications of Lawrence.238 Fortu-
nately, courts in the vast majority of states now apply the nexus ap-
proach rule, where a parent’s sexual orientation cannot be taken into 
                                                                                                             
 232 Nancy D. Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbian and Gay Parents Redux: The 
Irrelevance of Constitutional Principles, 60 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 226, 228 
(2013). 
 233 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574–75 (2003). 
 234 COURTNEY G. JOSLIN ET AL., LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND 
TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW § 1.5 (2014). 
 235 See e.g., Polikoff, supra note 232, at 228 (explaining that, even after Law-
rence, “it might be harder for a court to use a parent’s sexual orientation as a basis 
for denying or restricting custody or visitation”). 
 236 Joslin, supra note 234. 
 237 Polikoff, supra note 232, at 229. 
 238 See Maxwell v. Maxwell, 382 S.W.3d 892, 898-900 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010). 
96 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:64 
 
account in making a custody decision unless the parent’s sexual ori-
entation has directly harmed the child.239 
III. Comparing LGTBQ Rights in the United States and Chile 
The ruling in Lawrence is a general constitutional precedent, 
having little to do directly with child custody rights of LGBTQ par-
ents. However, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence articulates 
general principles that framed the country’s view on LGBTQ rights 
in the United States in the early 2000s. Further, the cases of Windsor 
and Obergefell were both highly contested, ending in a 5-4 decision 
in favor for LGBTQ rights.240 On the other hand, in the Atala’s case, 
the Supreme Court of Justice of Chile ruled in only a 3-2 decision.241 
So the difference between the current law on LGBTQ rights in either 
country is only one Supreme Court Justice’s opinion. As discussed, 
in South America, the Catholic Church continues to be the main po-
litical opponent to passing laws and expressing public policies fa-
vorable to sexual and reproductive rights.242 But if that is the answer 
to why Atala lost her children in the Chilean Supreme Court, can we 
say that is also why Obergefell was so highly debated, and legalized 
same-sex marriage by only one vote? In his dissenting opinion in 
Obergefell, Justice Scalia stated that it was severe for the Court to 
endorse a practice which is contrary to the religious beliefs of many 
of our citizens.243 Justice Alito argued that marriage is a religious 
right, not a political one, and that the majority was threatening “the 
religious liberty our Nation has long sought to protect.”244 As seen 
in the words of Justices Scalia and Alito, religion clearly played a 
vital role in their dissenting arguments in Obergefell. In fact, a ma-
jority of the justices on the bench today are Catholics.245 In closing, 
jurisprudence pertaining to LGBTQ rights is not that far ahead of 
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the Chilean Supreme Court. In fact, they are only one justice’s opin-
ion ahead. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, there is still a lot that has to be done across the 
world in terms of LGBTQ custody rights. Even though the United 
States has come far in the last 50 years with cases like Lawrence and 
Obergefell, the country still has a long way to go to reach total equal-
ity in terms of LGBTQ custody rights. 
LGBTQ child custody has progressed even slower in South 
America. So slowly that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
has had to step in to try and fix the problem. One reason for Chile’s 
slow progress is due to political impasse, while others blame it on 
the dominant role of the Catholic Church that is so deeply en-
trenched in Chilean society and politics. The Inter-American Court 
ruled on its first case related to discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation on December 18, 2009.246 The Chilean Supreme Court 
took a prominent judge’s children away just on the basis that she 
was homosexual.247 The court held that the children were in “a situ-
ation of risk” whose “pernicious consequences” would “damage 
their psychic development” and make them “objects of social dis-
crimination.”248 She eventually brought her case to Inter-American 
Court in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.249 The 
Inter-American Court, located in Washington D.C., concluded that 
the Chilean Supreme Court must pay Atala and her children over 
$60,000 in damages.250 The daughters are currently living with 
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Atala and her partner, Emma de Ramon.251 The Inter-American 
Court’s decision in Atala v. Chile advanced a series of human rights 
principles that are paramount for international and national courts to 
consider when issuing custody decisions with long-lasting effects on 
children and the parents involved, while incorporating human rights 
and the principle of non-discrimination. The Court held that discrim-
ination in regards to sexual orientation cannot be used to determine 
a child’s best interest, as this can harm both the child and the parent. 
The Inter-American Court also skillfully referred to the standard of 
harm that must be applied in cases that could result in the removal 
of children from the custody of either parent. The Court reasoned 
that the harm needs to be real and proven, not speculative and based 
on stereotypes, to be a determining factor in custody decisions. 
Lastly, the Court advanced the analysis related to the content of the 
children’s right to be heard in legal processes to be heard in legal 
processes that concern them. The case of Karen Atala changed the 
definition of a family for the Inter-American Court, which will 
hopefully be incorporated into Chilean law and culture. 
However, even though the United States, in Obergefell, has le-
galized same-sex marriage, the United States and South America are 
very familiar in their roots and culture. The dissents in Obergefell 
and Windsor have very similar wording to the majority’s opinion in 
Atala’s case. In fact, one could say that the difference between 
LGBTQ rights in the United States and Chile is just one vote. 
Another issue hindering the progression of human rights in 
South America, including Chile, is that the Latin American coun-
tries are failing to enforce the policies and orders of the Inter-Amer-
ican Court. Some argue that the supreme courts are implementing 
the Inter-American orders, however the local governments do not, 
slowing down the implementation of the Inter-American orders. On 
the other hand, perhaps Atala’s case had nothing to do with LGBT 
rights. Perhaps, instead, it was an issue of gender rights. Either way, 
the Inter-American Court must find new ways and policies to imple-
ment their orders to speed up the process of equal human rights. 
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